Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that competitive pressures will drive discriminatory behavior out of the market. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, we analyze how firm takeovers and product market competition affect firms' gender composition and gender wage gap. Taking into account several endogeneity concerns while using a difference-in-difference framework, we find that the share of female employees increases as a result of an ownership change when product market competition is weak.
Women earn less money and are far less likely to hold high ranking corporate management positions than men. And yet, the disparity in labor market outcomes is too large to be readily explained by differences in productivity. Even Sweden, a country perceived to enjoy high gender equality, is characterized by large gender differences in wages and carriers.
Among private employees in Sweden in 2002, for example, women earned 12 percent less than men after adjusting for differences in education, experience and firm specific effects. 1 Furthermore, women only held 11 percent of top management positions in Swedish public firms (Renstig and Westlin, 2006) . If these differences occur because of discrimination against women on the labor market, this constitutes a major inefficiency. Ever since Becker already in 1957 presented his seminal theory of taste-based discrimination, it has been suggested that labor market discrimination can be competed away, at least if discrimination is based on employer preferences.
An implication of Becker's theory is that competition will reduce both discriminatory and inefficient management practices. While this is usually interpreted as inefficient firms being competed away from the market, another possibility is that existing firms adjust their behavior when competitive pressures increase the relative cost of poor management. In this process, the firm takeover market can play an important role. First of all, takeovers have long been regarded as a restraint on inefficient management behavior. Second, firms with inefficient management practices tend to be taken over by other firms. When inefficient management practices allow discriminatory practices to linger in an organization, competitive pressures should improve the relative labor market position for women. This paper will address just this issue; we examine how competitive pressures in the form of takeovers and product market competition affect labor market outcomes for women.
When discrimination pervades the labor market, women are paid less in relation to their marginal product than men. That being the case, non-discriminatory firms would be expected to hire more women than discriminatory firms. But a non-discriminatory firm has no incentive to pay women more than the going market wage; predicting theoretical effects on gender wage differences on firm level is therefore less straightforward. Still, one can expect that competitive pressures would reduce these differences for two main reasons. First, women often lack career opportunities in discriminatory firms. Since wages are closely tied to an employee's hierarchical position, female relative wages should be higher in non-discriminatory firms.
Second, discriminatory owners may disproportionately share firm-level rents with men.
We use detailed Swedish employer-employee data from 1990-2002 to analyze how product market competition and firm takeovers affect workforce gender composition and gender wage differentials. In addition to providing high quality data, this study addresses the prediction that firm takeovers affect labor market outcomes for women; previous empirical studies have merely focused on the effects of product market competition.
2 Moreover, we use a theoretically sound measure of product market competition developed by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008) , whereas previous studies have mainly relied on rudimentary measures such as concentration ratios.
2 The only study, at least of which we are aware, studying ownership changes and discrimination, is Hellerstein et al. (2002) . They study if firms with a low share of women are more likely to be taken over on a sample of US firms, but find no such effects. They do not, however, study the effects of takeovers on the composition of employees.
Theoretical discussion and earlier literature Discrimination due to inefficient management
Theories of taste-based discrimination suggest that under some conditions, market forces will work to reduce discriminatory or other inefficient management practices. 3 The reason is that discrimination comes at a cost to the firm owner. Thus, if product market competition is strong, firms that incur the efficiency loss from discriminating against women will be competed away from the market. 4 Alternatively, firms may change their behavior as competition increases the costs incurred by a discriminating firm. 5 While outright discrimination may be rare today, there are reasons to expect discriminatory practices to linger in an organization as such. Based on psychological evidence, Bertrand et al. (2005) suggest that a great deal of discrimination may be unintentional, rather than due to preferences for or against a certain group. Hence, well-functioning human resource management may be important for reducing this type of "implicit" discrimination. 6 To the extent that more efficient firms have better human resource management, the theory of implicit discrimination yields the same predictions for the impact of 3 Hellerstein et al. (2002) provide a simple model that clearly illustrates the main predictions from Becker's theory of discrimination. 4 Perfect product market competition will put an end to discrimination if there are a sufficient number of potential employers with non-discriminatory tastes. Entry will also terminate discrimination when there is at least one nondiscriminating employer and non-decreasing returns to scale (Becker, 1971) . 5 Weber and Zulehner (2010) study start-ups on Austrian data and find evidence that both mechanisms are at work: the survival rate is significantly shorter for discriminatory firms and surviving discriminatory firms seem to react to the competitive pressures by increasing their female workforce over time. 6 In general, improvements in human resource management seem to be related to improvement in productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) . More specifically, Åslund and Nordström-Skans (2007) find that the introduction of anonymous job applications resulted in a higher rate of female hires in Sweden. This suggests that recruiter biases indeed affect the hiring process, but that better practices reduce discrimination.
market forces on the labor market outcome for men and women as the taste-based theory of discrimination.
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While the original Becker-theory was derived in an owner-manager setting, it also has implications when ownership and firm management are separated. In such cases, it is possible that market forces help disciplining firm managers who may pursue their own objectives (such as discriminating against women) rather than maximizing shareholder value. 8 In either setting, we expect there to be a larger share of women employed when product market competition limits inefficient management behavior. Furthermore, we expect firm takeovers to be one channel through which poor management practices are replaced by more efficient ones (Jensen 1988) . 9 Thus, on average, we expect the share of female employees to increase after an acquisition has taken place, and this effect should be especially large when product market competition is weak.
What about effects on the wages of men and women? Since wages are set by the market, it is not clear that takeovers and differences in product market competition should give rise to varying gender wage differentials across firms. Even non-discriminatory profit maximizing owners have no incentive to pay wages higher than the going market wage. To be more precise, gender wage differences ought to be the same for all firms recruiting similar workers in the same labor market. The relevant market for a certain type of labor may, however, only be firms active in one or two industries. In this case, stronger competition on the product market may reduce the industry's equilibrium gender wage gap. If, on the other hand, 7 Indeed, Bloom and van Reenen (2007) find that poor personnel management is more likely to survive in less competitive industries. Family-controlled firms, in which managers are arguably protected from takeover threats, exhibit particularly poor management practices, for example. 8 The literature on this topic is too large to cite. However, Nickell (1996) provides a nice discussion of the various mechanisms through which competitive forces can affect corporate performance through this channel and others. 9 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) present evidence that firm managers respond to anti-takeover laws by reducing their efforts to improve firm productivity.
the type of labor is used in many sectors in the economy, changes in product market competition in one industry should only have negligible effects on the firm's gender wage gap.
An analogous reasoning suggests that the effects of a change in firm ownership may be limited since a change in a single firm's attitude towards women will only have marginal effects on equilibrium wages.
This said, there are reasons to study wage differences between men and women. First, female career opportunities may differ between firms as a result of inefficient management practices. 10 Another reason is that firms may share rents with workers. Weak product market competition should give rise to larger rents and thus, possibly higher wages. Since discriminating firms prefer men, these rents may be disproportionally shared with their male employees. In a study of rent-sharing in Swedish firms, Nekby (2003) finds that rents are indeed shared disproportionally with male employees. Thus, we expect product market competition to reduce male wages, thereby improving the relative wages of women. In this case, a takeover may also reduce discrimination and the firm's gender wage gap.
Statistical discrimination
Another reason behind discrimination is information difficulties about workers, so-called statistical discrimination. Hiring practices are then related to group attributes rather than individual characteristics (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973) . 11 If groups differ in average abilities and information costs are high, even perfectly rational employers would discriminate in the statistical sense as such behavior is profitable. As in the case of implicit discrimination, it is 10 See e.g. Blau and DeVaro (2006) who show that, on average, women have a lower probability of being promoted than men when controlling for productivity. They also show wages to be intimately related to promotions. For a detailed analysis of such glass ceiling effects in Sweden, see Albrecht et al. (2003) 11 See also Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview of more recent research along those lines. (ii) a firm becomes part of another corporation, defined as a new top-mother of the corporation, using data from the corporation register. Our data enable us to analyze the effects of both cross-border acquisitions and purely domestic takeovers. Takeovers that we fail to identify are domestic ownership changes of small stand-alone firms that are not part of a corporation.
13 Statistics Sweden uses the internationally common 50 percent cut-off when defining ownership. We are not able to study whether the results are sensitive to this definition. However, other authors have studied the effects of takeover and in these cases, the results are not sensitive to cut-off values (see e.g. Martins (2004) and Barbosa and Louri (2002) ). Although the 50 percent cut-off may be considered as crude, we are ultimately interested in whether a controlling owner is replaced by another controlling owner. Since the actual cut-off at which this occurs depends on the ownership structure as a whole, any cut-off level would be crude. 14 Although Statistic Sweden is responsible for the corporation register, it has been collected and produced by the consulting firm MM Partners since 1996. This means that we have corporation register information from Statistics Sweden for 1990-1995 and from MM partners for the period 1996-2002. The same methodology for producing the corporation register is, however, used over the entire period. Due to the change in who produces the corporation register in 1996, we choose not to include information on changes in the firms' corporation status between the years 1995 and 1996.
Measure of product market competition
Ensuing from Becker's original analysis, this paper follows in a long line of empirical research that has studied the relation between product market competition and labor market discrimination. Despite mixed results from early research, later studies tend to find that competition on the product market restrains discrimination (see e.g. Ashenfelter and Hannan 1986 , Black and Brainard 2004 , Hellerstein et al. 2002 , Meng 2004 and Zweimüller et al., 2008 . 15 Product market competition has usually been measured using industry-level concentration ratios and firm-level measures of market power. This paper uses a more sophisticated measure of product market competition suggested by Boone et al (2007) .
Product market competition is rather a vague concept that is not easily captured in a single empirical measure. The measurement issue is even more difficult since different changes in market conditions, i.e. anything that can be said to be associated with increased competition (e.g. firm entry or increased substitutability of goods), can have different implications for firm behavior. Therefore, the appropriate measure of product market competition is context specific.
In our case, we want to use a measure of competition capturing how severely the market punishes inefficient firm behavior.
Based on the theoretical work in Boone (2004), Boone et al. (2007) derive an empirical measure of product market competition precisely along these lines. The starting point is that traditional measures of competition, such as concentration ratios and price-cost margins, are theoretically invalid and especially concentration ratios are of limited empirical value. The theoretically sound measure of competition they derive is based on the within-industry 15 It should be noted that Zweimüller et al. (2008) analyze gender wage gaps between countries and use a country level indicator of general market orientation.
elasticity of profits with respect to marginal costs. The higher the absolute value of this elasticity, the fiercer is competition. In other words, the measure is based on an estimate of how much relative profits are reduced when there is an increase in firms' marginal costs. The measure of competition is generated by estimating the following relation for each 2-digit SNI industry, 16 using OLS:
Subscript j is a firm-level identifier and t indicates time period. Variable profits, , are defined as value added less the total wage bill. Marginal costs are approximated by average variable costs, c, which are defined as the total wage bill plus the costs of variable inputs (sales less value added), divided by sales. 17 Unobservable heterogeneity is taken into account by firm fixed effects,  j , and time fixed effects,  t . The absolute value of the estimated profit elasticity,  t , is used as our time-varying industry measure of product market competition.
Using this method, our results show that product market competition (averaged over the 1990-2002 period) is lowest in the utilities (SNI 40), followed by the banking sector (65), rental services (71), transport services (61) and the construction industry (45). Apparel (18) is the most competitive industry, followed by transport equipment (35), the paper industry (21) and electronic components (32). The resulting ranking of industries thus has a considerable intuitive appeal. The industries characterized by weak competition are mainly active on the domestic market, whereas industries exposed to tough international competition are active on markets characterized by strong product market competition.
16 SNI roughly corresponds to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 17 In other words, c = (sales  value added + wages)/sales.
The Swedish takeover market
As discussed earlier, inefficient management is a potential reason for a takeover. By replacing wasteful management practices takeovers can increase productivity. Clearly there are also other reasons for takeovers, for example, firms may want to obtain market power or to get access to distribution channels. 18 The market for firm control in Sweden has become more competitive over time as the rules surrounding foreign ownership have become less and there is no trend in takeover activity; the acquisition rate hovers between 5 to 9 percent per year. The highest rate of acquisition is in manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum (16 percent) and the lowest in the tanning and dressing of leather (0.1 percent). When it comes to raw numbers, however, the bulk of takeovers occur in the retail industry. Further, there are no obvious industry specific time trends in merger activity. Table 1 presents the correlation between takeover activity and various industry characteristics at the two digit industry level.
There appears to be relatively many takeovers in industries with a low share of females, weak product market competition, low capital intensity, large firms and a large share of high skilled employees. A negative correlation between takeovers and product market competition in a cross-section is no obvious problem in our econometric study since we use firm fixed effects.
However, if changes in takeover activity affect product market competition, it could influence the interpretation of our results. As we find no indication of changes in competition being related to the rate of takeover activity, this is unlikely to be a severe problem.
[ Table 1 ]
Summary statistics
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 . Column one shows the mean and standard deviations for the whole sample of firms and column two presents individual level data for the matched employer-employee data.
[ Table 2 ]
As can be seen in the first row, on average about 30 percent of the employees are women and there is substantial variation across firms. 19 The differences in means between the two samples are due to the fact that individual-level data naturally puts more weight on larger firms than data at the firm level.
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Testing predictions from the theory of taste-based discrimination
The share of female employees
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of product market competition and ownership changes on the share of female employees by estimating the following firm-level regression:
Here, y jt is the share of women employed by firm j in time period t, while acquisition is an indicator variable taking the value of one in the period where an ownership change is recorded and thereafter. Competition is our time-varying industry-level measure of product market competition, described earlier. An obvious concern with this specification is that acquisitions may have an impact on the level of product market competition. Since our hypothesis is that the efficiency gains from an acquisition will be largest in industries with low levels of competition at the time of the acquisition, we interact the acquisition dummy with a measure of competition from the year of acquisition.
One concern is that changes in firms' input mix will affect the optimal share of female employees, irrespective of ownership changes. Therefore, we include a vector, X, of firm-level control variables such as (log) firm size, capital intensity and the share of employees with higher education. Since all these variables can be endogenous to takeovers, we will present specifications with and without these controls. Finally, µ j and µ t are firm and time period fixed effects and  jt is the error term. To allow for within firm correlation over time, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. In some specifications, when studying the impact of product market competition, we cluster standard errors at the industry level. We expect a 1 to be positive and a 3 to be negative. In other words, we expect firms to employ a larger share of women after a new owner has taken control of the firm and that this effect is weaker when product market competition is strong. Strong product market competition is, in itself, expected to have a positive effect on the share of women, thus a 2 >0.
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The endogeneity problem
In this difference-in-difference setting, all firms that are not changing ownership in the same time period act as the control group. Since firms do not randomly change ownership, this approach suffers from potential endogeneity problems. First of all, theory suggests that firms with inefficient management are more likely takeover targets than non-discriminatory ones.
Further, firms that change ownership may already before the takeover be developing differently from firms that are not taken over. 22 Our first take on the endogeneity problem is to deal with the issue of potentially omitted variables that may be related to the likelihood of 21 Our measure of competition is an estimated regressor which should be considered when estimating the standard errors. However, Murphy and Topel (1985) derive a correction for two-stage models of this kind and Hardin (2002) shows that the Huber-White sandwich estimator is asymptotically identical to the Murphy-Topel estimator.
To allow for within firm or industry correlation over time, standard errors in our paper are adjusted for clustering at the firm or industry level. This adjustment is a cluster-robust version of the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 22 In other words, the concern is that the "parallel trends" assumption is violated or, more technically, that acquisitions are correlated with the error term.
being a takeover target. First, this is done by exploiting the fact that all takeovers do not occur in the same time period. Using the "staggered" nature of the data, we compare the baseline estimates from the full sample of firms to the estimates we get when dropping all firms that are never takeover targets from the sample. Since identification in both cases comes from withinfirm variation, the difference between the two approaches lies in the choice of control group.
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If takeover targets as a group have different observable and unobservable characteristics than other firms, using the target sample gives a better estimate of the actual takeover effect, provided that the characteristics are not time varying. Next, we undertake a before-and-after analysis checking if the timing of events is consistent with takeovers being the driving force.
Finally, we make use of very flexible empirical specifications allowing takeover targets to be on a different trend than other firms and allowing the effects of observable firm characteristics to interact with the time period fixed effects.
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Wages
We study how product market competition and takeovers affect the gender wage difference by estimating the following individual-level regression:
In this regression, ln(wage) ijt is the log of the full-time equivalent monthly wage of an individual i, employed by firm j at time period t, and wom is a dummy variable taking the value of one for women. The interaction terms should be self-explanatory, while X is a vector of time-varying firm-level controls and Z is a vector of time-varying individual controls. We include a "spell" fixed-effect µ ij for each unique firm-individual combination (see e.g. Andrews et al., 2005) . 25 Finally, µ t are time fixed effects and  ijt is the error term. We expect both b 1 and b 2 to be positive. In case of pre-takeover discrimination, a takeover should reduce the gender wage differences. Similarly, intense product market competition should reduce the scope for discrimination and wage differences should be relatively small when competition is high.
One possible channel between competition and gender wage differences is through rent-sharing. This mechanism will be directly addressed by interacting measures of profitability with our measures of competitive pressures.
Results
Evidence of taste-based discrimination in employment decisions
The first question we address is whether employment decisions are related to takeovers and the degree of product market competition. If this is the case, we expect takeovers to increase the share of women employed, in particular when product market competition is weak. An increase in product market competition should also in itself induce the firm to hire more women. Table   3 presents results showing some evidence in line with these predictions. 25 Note that in the case of no mobility between firms, individual fixed-effects and individual-firm spell fixedeffects are identical. Since the structure of our data is such that information on employees originates from repeated samples of firms, there is limited mobility between firms over time. This means that individual fixed effects and spell-fixed effects are very similar.
[ Table 3] In the first column, we estimate the effect of a takeover using a within firm differencesin-differences specification. As can be seen in column 1, there is weak evidence of stronger product market competition being associated with a higher share of female employees. The takeover effect is small and not statistically significant, however. In the second column, we consider the interaction effect between takeovers and competition. In line with our expectations, we see that a takeover has a larger effect if product market competition is weak.
Both the estimates of the direct effect and the interaction effect have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Then, once more, quantitatively speaking, the effect of a takeover is small: The direct effect of a takeover, when competition equals zero (the lowest possible value), is that the share of women employed increases by one percentage point.
When competition is at its mean value of about 4.5, the effect of a takeover is reduced to approximately zero.
The estimated magnitudes of the interaction term and the direct acquisition effect are a cause for some concern. At higher than median levels of product market competition, it appears as if a takeover reduces the share of female employees -a finding that is hard to reconcile with any theory of discrimination. To more closely investigate these effects, we include a quadratic term of the interaction term in the third column. Interestingly, the quadratic term is positive and significant, showing the interaction between takeovers and competition to be quite complex. At the lowest possible degree of competition, a takeover is associated with an increase in the share of female employees by 1.4 percentage points, which is a 4.3 percent increase for the firm with an average share of women in the workforce. The takeover effect reaches its minimum at about the mean level of competition and then increases slowly. In fact, it seems as if a takeover has a positive effect on the share of women employed up until the average level of competition. At higher levels of competition, the takeover effect is basically zero. 26 In columns four and five, we include a set of (potentially endogenous) firm level control variables, but this does not affect the results.
In column six, we only include domestic ownership changes and in column seven, we only include cross-border acquisitions. There is some difference in the estimated coefficient size but qualitatively, the results point in the same direction. Finally, in the last column, we control for the share of female employees at the industry level but, once more, the results are stable.
Robustness checks
Although the basic results show that a takeover affects the employment decision in the firm, several concerns remain. The most obvious objection to the results presented in Table 3 might be that takeover targets differ from those of other firms in many respects. In this section, we will address these concerns in different ways.
Are takeover targets different?
The difference-in-difference estimates will be corrupt if the share of women employed in the firms that change ownership follow a different trend than other firms. Our first take on this 26 A concern may be that there are only takeovers in industries characterized by strong product market competition, thus making it difficult to interpret the results. However, there is no correlation between the number or the share of takeovers in an industry and our measure of product market competition.
problem is to allow different time trends for the two groups of firms. In the first column of Table 4 , we see that our results are not affected by allowing separate trends.
A further concern is that firms changing ownership are very different from other firms and are therefore differently affected by shocks contemporaneous to the takeover. Such shocks may cause the firms to adjust the input factors which, in turn, may cause firms to adjust the optimal share of female employees. To account for this, we allow other explanatory variables to change over time by interacting all observable firm characteristics with the time period fixed effects. In the second column of Table 4 , we allow the estimates to vary by year and, in the third column, we add a separate time trend for firms that change ownership over the period. In the fourth column, we add the average share of women in the industry. In the last two columns of Table 4 , we only include firms that changed ownership at some point in time, thereby changing the control group to firms that will, but have not yet changed ownership. The effects are thus estimated only using the staggered nature of takeovers. The results largely remain the same between all different specifications and very close to the original estimates. All in all, the results suggest that the effects we are estimating are due to the takeover and not to some unobserved trends affecting firms in the takeover sample.
[ Table 4 ]
Takeover dynamics
Another potential concern is that a short-term change in economic conditions induces both an ownership change and an increase in the share of female employees. In this case, we expect to see some effect of the takeover prior to the actual change in ownership.
In Table 5 , we analyze the dynamics of the effect of a takeover by investigating how the takeover effect is spread over time.
In the first column, we investigate the effect of the takeover after one, two and three years or more. To this end, we include a dummy for the year of the takeover, Acquisition t=0, and three dummies capturing the periods after the change of ownership. Acquisition t+1 is a dummy for the period after the takeover, Acquisition t+2 for two periods after the takeover and Acquisition>t+2 refers to a dummy that takes the value of one, three periods or more after the takeover. The results show an instant effect of the takeover that then remains constant over time. In the second column, we study whether the share of women started to increase prior to the actual takeover. This is done by including a dummy for the year before the takeover,
Acquisition t-1, and a dummy for the year two years prior to the takeover, Acquisition t-2.
Inspecting the estimates reported in the second column, we see no effect of either of the dummies, thus suggesting that there was no effect prior to the takeover. In the third column, we allow for effects both before and after the takeover. Consistent with previous results, there is no effect before the takeover and the impact of the takeover increases somewhat over time. In the last three columns of Table 5 , we perform the same exercise as above but only using the sample of firms that changes ownership at some point in time. The results are essentially identical between the two different samples.
[ Table 5 ]
Alternative explanations
An alternative explanation to the results is that firms that change ownership also increase their number of employees. As the number of potential female employees is likely to be relatively large among younger cohorts, the share of women employed by the firm could therefore increase mechanically after a takeover. To explore this hypothesis, we regress (the log of) firm size on the acquisition takeover dummy, the measure of product market competition and an interaction term. In the first column of Table 6 , we find a marginally significant effect of takeovers on firm size. In columns two and three, we analyze how the share of women among the relatively young (up to 39 years) and old (above 40 years) employees are affected by a takeover. As the share of women in both age groups increases after the takeover, we are quite assured that our main results are not driven by mechanical composition changes.
[ Table 6 ]
Another potential mechanical explanation for our results is that firms that are taken over also tend to outsource various parts of the production process. To the extent that women are overor under represented in the lines of production being outsourced this can, again mechanically, affect the share of female employees in a firm. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on outsourcing but, for a subset of firms, we have firm-level data on offshoring measured as the share of imported intermediate goods in total sales. In column 4, we run our main regression on the sample of firms for which we have offshoring data. In column 5, we add the offshoring measure and in column 6 also an interaction with Competition and find that the results remain unchanged.
Finally, in the last column of Table 6 , we run the main regression but exclude firms that experience a particular (more than 80 percent) increase in the number of employees in the year following the ownership change. Once more, the results remain unchanged, indicating that we are not just capturing some mechanical effect that coincides with the takeover.
Sub-group analysis
The results concerning the impact of takeovers on the share of female employees appear to be robust to various specifications. It is, however, possible that there are important heterogeneities among different employee subgroups. To analyze this, we calculate the share of women among employees with low, medium, and high levels of education. For a more limited sample of firms, we also have employee classifications and can calculate the share of female managers and CEOs.
As can be seen in the first three columns of Table 7 , the increase in the share of female employees appears to be concentrated among those with medium levels of education. In the last two columns, we find no significant effect of takeovers on the share of female managers or CEOs. As glass ceiling effects (Albrecht et al., 2003) should be more concentrated among the most well educated and among the highest ranking employees, this can be seen as evidence against takeovers affecting the career opportunities of women.
[ Table 7 ]
Productivity effects
Our main hypotheses rely on the assumption that entering owners of a firm will run the firm in a more efficient way than previous owners. There is a substantive literature on the productivity effects of takeovers (see e.g. Conyon et al. (2002) and the references therein) and here, we can just present some indicative evidence of such a mechanism. In the first column of Table 8, we run value added per worker -a commonly used proxy for labor productivity -on our takeover indicator. The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant. In column two, we see that this productivity enhancing effect of a takeover is particularly large when product market competition is weak. Both these results are consistent with our findings for female employees. In columns three and four, we add two potentially endogenous control variables that can affect labor productivity; share of highly educated workers and capital per labor ratio.
Once more, the results indicate that labor productivity is increased following a takeover.
[ Table 8 here]
Wages
So far, we have found support for the notion that market forces improve the relative labor market outcomes for women. Now, we turn to studying individual wages. The question we ask is whether female relative wages are affected by a takeover or by the degree of product market competition. In this part of the analysis, we control for employee-firm spell fixed effects to isolate the effect of a change in ownership on an individual's wages. We also control for timevarying firm characteristics such as number of employees, capital intensity and the fraction of the workforce that is high skilled. We also include the square of (potential) work life experience.
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The results are reported in Table 9 . Inspecting the first column, we find no change in female relative wages following a takeover. However, we do see that increased product market competition seems to reduce wages, thus improving the relative position of women. This result is in line with Black and Strahan (2001) who find that banking deregulation reduces male wages more than female wages. The effects in economic terms are small, however. A standard deviation increase in the level of product market competition reduces male wages by 0.6 percent and female wages by 0.2 percent, thereby reducing the gender wage difference by 0.4 percentage points. Since the wage gap between men and women in our sample is 12 percent after adjusting for educational attainment, experience and firm fixed effects, the impact of product market competition is 3.3 percent.
[ Table 9 ]
In the first two columns, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level since the whole firm is affected by a takeover. Similarly, as the whole industry is affected by a change in the level of product market competition, the appropriate level of clustering may be the industry level. In column 3, standard errors are therefore clustered at the industry level. This reduces the statistical significance of product market competition, but the effect is still significant at the ten-percent level.
One channel through which competition may reduce the gender wag gap is through rent-sharing. In column 4, we look at this directly by including profits per employee and interacting this with a female dummy and the takeover indicator. Our hypothesis is that an ownership change will increase the rent-sharing with female employees relative to the rentsharing with male employees. In line with this hypothesis, we find the triple interaction-term between these variables to be positive and statistically significant. In column 5, we find no indication that the gender bias of rent-sharing is systematically related to product market competition. In columns 6 and 7, we include interactions between both acquisitions and product market competition. Regardless of whether we cluster at the individual or the industry level, we find rent-sharing to be systematically more in favor of women following a takeover.
Conclusions
Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that discriminatory practices due to employer preferences should not prevail in competitive markets and competitive forces should reduce gender differences in labor market outcomes. The findings in this paper indicate that takeovers and product market competition, do indeed have a positive impact on the relative position of Swedish female employees. According to theory, discriminatory employers will hire fewer women reducing the demand for female labor depressing women's wages. A nondiscriminatory owner will then choose to hire more women to the going market wage. Thus, when a non-discriminatory owner takes over a discriminating firm we expect the share of women employed to increase. In contrast, the effect on within firm gender wage differentials is not clear.
In line with these predictions we find that when product market competition is weak, a takeover leads to a 4.3 percent increase in the share of female employees for a firm with an average rate of female employment. This effect is concentrated among women with medium level of education whereas we find no effects on the share of managers and CEOs. For firms active on markets with average or strong product market competition, takeovers have no effect on the gender composition of the firm's workforce. Moreover, we find no impact by takeovers on the gender wage gap within the firm. However, a takeover reduces the gender differences in rent-sharing, thus suggesting that discriminatory practices may work through this channel.
As opposed to a takeover, product market competition affects whole segments of the labor market. Increases in the level of competition may therefore reduce the gender wage gap in an industry. Our results are in line with this prediction. A one standard deviation increase in product market competition is associated with a reduction of the gender wage difference by 3.3 percent or 0.4 percentage points.
Our results do not refute the possibility of other types of discrimination. Statistical discrimination, for example, may affect the position of women on the labor market. However, statistical discrimination could also be affected by takeovers and product market competition since competitive pressures may improve the quality of the hiring and promotion processes. is the share of women employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Ln(size) is the log of the number of employees. Capital/L is the capital-labor ratio. Share high skilled is the share of employees with post-secondary education. Share women (industry) is the share of women employed at the two-digit industry level. Column (6) excludes all cross-border mergers and column (7) excludes all domestic mergers. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Table 2 ; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. Share women (industry) is the share of women employed at the two-digit industry level. Target×trend is an interaction between firms that are ever takeover targets and a trend variable. Firm controls×Year FE means that firm controls are interacted with year fixed effects. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) only include firms that change ownership. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. is the share of women employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Acquisition t-2 takes the value of one two years prior to the acquisition and zero otherwise. The other Acquisition t+/-variables are defined accordingly. Firm controls are the same as in Table 2 ; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. Columns (4)-(6) only include firms that change ownership. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively (1) is the log of the number of employees and firm controls are the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skill. In columns (2) and (3) the dependent variables are the share of young and old women employed, respectively. In columns (4)-(7), the dependent variable is the share of women employed. Firm controls in column (2)-(7) are the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. Columns (4)-(6) only include firms for which we have data on offshoring and in column (7) firms are excluded which increase more than 80 percent in size during the year of the ownership change. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of women among employees with low education (column (1)), medium education (column (2)) and high education (column (3)). In column (4) the dependent variable is the share of female managers and column (5) female CEOs. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Firm controls are the same as in Table 2 ; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Ln(size) is the log of the number of employees. Capital/L is the capital-labor ratio. Share high skilled is the share of employees with post-secondary education. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The dependent variable is log wages. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Profits/L is the profits per employee. Individual control is the square of work experience. Individual level control is potential experience squared. Firm controls are the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of employees with postsecondary education. All regressions include spell (individual×firm) and year fixed effects. In all columns, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, except columns (3) and (7) where they are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
